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S. F., 47 Cal.2d 729 l306 P.2d 432]; Leonard v. Watsonville Community Hospital, 47 Cal.2d 509 [305 P.2d 36];
Danner v. Atk1:ns, 47 Cal.2d 327 [303 P.2d 724]; Barrera
v. De La Torre., ante, p. 166 [308 P.2d 724], filed March
22, 1957.) ·whether this conservative trend is in accord with
public interest may be open to serious question. In my opinion
it is more in keeping with the public interest that these
doctrines be liberally applied by our courts.
I would therefore reverse the judgment.

[Crim. No. 5981.

In Bank.

Apr. 9, 1957.]

THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JOHN E. CHEARY,
Appellant.
[1] Homicide-Murder in First Degree-Killing in Perpetration of
Certain Felonies.-To prove defendant guilty of first degree
murder on either the ground that the deceased's death resulted
from injuries inflicted on her by defendant in an attempt to
rape her or in the perpetration of a burglary by breaking and
entering the home of deceased's daughter with intent to rape
the daughter, it was incumbent on the prosecution to prove
that defendant had the specific intent to rape when he entered
the daughter's home or that he had the specific intent to rape
when he assaulted the deceased.
[2] Id.-Evidence.-Regardless of whether or not defendant in a
first degree murder case had the intent to rape deceased's
daughter when he went to the daughter's home, the jury could
reasonably infer, from his forcing open the door and grabbing
the daughter after being informed that he was not welcome,
that defendant then had the specific intent to rape.
[3] !d.-Defenses-Intoxication: Province of Court and Jury.If defendant in a murder case was so intoxicated that he did
not, as charged, have the specific intent to rape either the deceased or her daughter at the time he went to the daughter's
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 77; Am.Jur., Homicide, § 39.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 13] Homicide,§ 15(6); [2] Homicide,
§145(3); [3] Homicide, §§28, 163; [4] Homicide, §159; [5, 6]
Jury, § 103(7); [7, 9] Criminal Law, § 522; [8, 10] Criminal
Law, § 524; [11] Homicide, §§ 185, 190; [12] Homicide, § 267;
[14] Criminal Law,§ 331; [15] Criminal Law,§ 1404; [16] Criminal Law, § 1086; [17] Criminal Law, § 1402; [18, 19] Criminal
Law, § 1404(13); [20, 21] Criminal Law, § 619; [22] Criminal Law,
§ 617; [23, 25] Criminal Law,§ 1404(12); [24] Criminal Law,§ 624.
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home immediately preceding the killing or at the time of his
assault on the deceased, he was not guilty of first degree murder, but whether he was so intoxicated was a question for the
jury.
[4] Id.-Evidence-Defenses-Intoxication.-In a prosecution for
first degree murder on either the ground that the deceased's
death resulted from injuries inflicted by defendant in an attempt to rape her or in the perpetration of a burglary by
breaking and entering the home· of deceased's daughter with
intent to rape the daughter, evidence that immediately preceding the killing he decided to go to see the daughter, that
he drove his car from a tavern to the residence of the daughter's friend, identified himself, and unsuccessfully asked for
the daughter's address, that he walked to a neighbor's residence and asked where the daughter lived, that he recognized
his brother when he saw him in the daughter's living room
following the killing, and that he had the presence of mind
to absolve his brother of blame for the killing, supported the
jury's implied finding that he was not so intoxicated that he
did not have specific intent to rape.
[5a, 5b] Jury-Challenges-Questions as to Death Penalty.-It
was not error to excuse four prospective jurors in a first degree murder case on the ground that they entertained conscientious opinions that would preclude their voting for the
death penalty where, though there was some discussion of the
propriety of the court's ruling, the tenor of the discussion
afforded no reason to believe that the death penalty was overemphasized or that the jurors thought the court was endorsing
the death penalty, and where the discussion was precipitated
and prolonged by defendant's counsel who did not suggest that
it be conducted out of the jury's presence until it was nearly
terminated.
[6] !d.-Challenges-Questions as to Death Penalty.-The jury's
choice between possible punishments for first degree murder
is to be made during and not before its deliberations on that
question, and a juror who entertains views formulated before
trial that compel him to vote for one of the two possible
punishments regardless of what the evidence at the trial may
reveal should be excused.
[7] Criminal Law- Evidence- Documentary Evidence- Photogra.phs.-It was not error to admit in evidence in a first degree murder case photographs of decedent's body taken after
embalmment as against the objection that no proper foundation
for their admission had been laid, where the photographs
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Jury, ~ 115.
[7] See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 226 et seq.; Am.Jur., Evidence,
§ 727 et seq.
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were properly authenticated by the pathologist who looked at
them and testified that they accurately portrayed what he had
seen, for it is not necessary to authc>nticate a photograph, that
the person who took it testify or be identified.
[8] !d.-Evidence-Documentary Evidence-Photographs.-It is
error to receive in evidence gruesome photographs of a homicide victim designed primarily to arouse the passions of the
jury, but such photographs are admissible when they are relevant to the issues before the court and their probative value
is not outweighed by the danger of prejudice to defendant.
[9] Id. -Evidence- Documentary Evidence- Photographs.Whether the probative value of a particular photograph outweighs its possible prejudicial effect is a question to be resolved by the trial court in the exercise of its judicial discretion.
[10] !d.-Evidence- Documentary Evidence- Photographs.-It
was not an abuse of discretion to admit photographs of decedent's body in a homicide case where they were admitted in
connection with a pathologist's testimony regarding the extent
of decedent's injuries and the cause of death, the latter being
a matter disputed by defendant, and where they were corroborative of the pathologist's testimony and helped to show the
extent of decedent's injuries.
[11] Homicide-Instructions-Grades and Degrees of Offense.It was not error in a homicide case to refuse to give defendant's requested instructions on voluntary manslaughter and the
difference between murder and manslaughter where these matters were adequately covered by the court in its instructions.
[12] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-Any error in
refusing to give defendant's requested instructions directed at
the difference between murder and manslaughter was not
prejudicial where the jury found defendant guilty of first
degree murder, and where the only ground urged by the district attorney for such conviction was that the deceased's
death resulted from injuries inflicted on her in an attempt
to rape her or in the perpetration of a burglary by breaking
and entering the home of deceased's daughter with intent to
rape the daughter.
[13] !d.-Murder in First Degree-Killing in Perpetration of Certain Felonies.-If in the perpetration of a burglary or attempted rape defendant inflicted injuries on the deceased that
caused her death, he is guilty of first degree murder even if he
unintentionally inflicted those injuries on her, and it is immaterial whether he used his hands or fists or something more
inherently dangerous.
[14] Criminal Law-Conduct of Judge-Toward CounseL-Where
counsel for defendant in a first degree murder case asked a
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pathologist on cross-examination whether it was not common
for elderly people to be bedridden, apparently in an attempt
to show that decedent might have been suffering from hypostatic pneumonia before being injured by defendant, and the
court overruled an objection to the question commenting,
however, that the question was "pretty broad," whereupon
defendant's counsel attempted several times to explain the
reason for his question, but the court refused to permit the
explanation and admonished counsel that "there's some limit
we can't go beyond," to which defendant's counsel replied that
he did not appreciate admonishment when he did not deserve
it, and the court then stated, "I'm the one that's going to run
this court," the court's remarks were not inappropriate and
did not bring defense counsel into disfavor with the jury or
work to defendant's prejudice, especially in view of the fact
that before instructing the jury the court explained to the
jurors that in such cases the attorneys are necessarily under
great pressure and complimented them both on the manner in
which they tried the case.
[15] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting Attorney.-In a prosecution for first degree murder, an insinuation by the district attorney that defendant's military record
was unsatisfactory was improper, but did not result in prejudice to defendant where the court correctly admonished the
jury to disregard the district attorney's statement.
[16] !d.-Appeal-Objections-Conduct of Court.-A claim of
misconduct on the part of the trial court will ordinarily not
be considered on appeal unless the party who complains has
given the court an opportunity to correct the error or false
impression.
[17] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Court.-In a
prosecution for first degree murder, the court's inadvertent
statement, made a short time after admonishing the jury to
disregard the district attorney's insinuation that defendant's
military record was unsatisfactory, "of course, the matter will
be subject to cross-examination and can't help be brought out,"
was not prejudicial to defendant.
[18] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Argument of Prosecuting Attorney.-Where the district attorney in a first degree murder
case, while summarizing the testimony of a pathologist regarding evidence of rape, stated to the jury that the pathologist
was unable to determine whether there had been any intercourse with decedent, and defendant's counsel objected, terming such statement a "deliberate misquotation," whereupon the
court stated that any misquotation did not appear deliberate,
and then, after the district attorney urged that his remarks
be struck from the record, the court ordered the remarks
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stricken and admonished the jury to pay no attention to them,
whereupon the district attorney said that the jury's "recollections are sufficient to recall what the doctor testified to ... in
that regard," but defense counsel did not object and did not
request an admonition concerning this last remark, neither
such remark nor the original statement was prejudicial, especially where defense counsel, during his own argument, later
quoted the actual statement of the pathologist, "I found no
injuries in the pelvic area.''
[19] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Argument of Prosecuting Attorney.-In a prosecution for first degree murder, the district
attorney's misstatement of the evidence when he asserted that
decedent's friend had testified that defendant was pulling up
his trousers when she entered decedent's bedroom, whereas
the friend had actually testified that "he was holding his
pants," did not mislead the jury where the friend's testimony
was fresh in the minds of the jurors, the trial having lasted
only a few days.
[20] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Inferences From Evidence.-In a
prosecution for first degree murder, the district attorney in
his argument to the jury could reasonably draw an inference
from the evidence that defendant was pulling up his trousers
when decedent's daughter, a friend and an arresting officer
entered decedent's bedroom, where it was uncontroverted that
defendant's trousers were unbuttoned, where decedent's friend
testified that defendant was holding his pants, and where there
were blood smears on the back and top of defendant's shorts
and trousers which could have been caused by defendant's
pulling up his pants with his hands, which were covered with
blood.
[21] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Inferences From Evidence.-In
a prosecution for first degree murder, the district attorney
in his argument to the jury could reasonably draw an inference from the evidence that defendant "reached over underneath the blankets and underneath [decedent's] nightgown and
grabbed her by the leg and at the same time crawling on the
bed," where there were marks on decedent's thigh that could
have been made by defendant's fingernails, and her bed spring
could have been knocked down by defendant in climbing onto
the bed.
[22] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Scope.-In a prosecution for first
degree murder, the district attorney's reference during his
argument to "the pure, killing horror of the situation" was
not unreasonable where he was speaking of the situation when
decedent's daughter found that a neighbor's telephone would
not function and she could not summon the police to aid her
mother because she had not replaced her own telephone re-

::lOG

PEOPLE

v.

CHEARY

[48 C.2d

her telephone being on the same party line, and the
district attorney's statement that defendant "didn't care who
lhis victim] was as long as he satisfied that monstrous lust
of his" was not inflammatory in nature where such an inference could reasonably be drawn from the evidence.
[23] Id.-Appeal-Ha.rmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-ln a prosecution for first degree murder alleged to
have resulted from an attempt to rape the victim, the district
attorney's statement during his argument to the jury that
"the specific intent which is involved is the intent to have
sexual intercourse" did not constitute prejudicial error where,
after defense counsel pointed out that the district attorney
implied that one cannot intend sexual intercourse without
intending rape, the court ruled that such remark was improper
and later gave correct instructions on the law of rape and
charged the jury that counsel's statements as to the law were
not to be relied on.
[24] !d.-Argument of Counsel-Scope-Arguing Law.-In a prosecution for first degree murder, the district attorney did not
misstate the law of burglary and felony murder where he
argued that if defendant broke in the door of the home of
decedent's daughter with intent to rape the daughter he was
guilty of first degree murder, and that he was also guilty of
such offense if, at the time he smashed in the front door,
he had committed a burglary and the killing was done in the
perpetration of burglary.
[25] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Misconduct of Prosecuting
Attorney.-In a prosecution for first degree murder, the district attorney's statement during his argument to the jury
that counsel for defendant had not requested an acquittal
because he did not wish to insult the intelligence of the jury
did not constitute reversible error where it was improbable
that the jury was misled, in view of the fact that defendant's
counsel entered vigorous objection and the court admonished
the jury to disregard such statement.

APPEAL (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b)), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislam; County and from an order denying a new trial. David
F. Bush, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
the death penalty, affirmed.
Jack B. Lamb for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Thomas W. Martin,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, and Doris H. Maier, Deputy
Attorney General, for Hespondent.
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TRAYNOR, J.-A jury returned a verdict that defendant
was guilty of murder in the first degree and fixed the
punishment at death. The trial court denied a motion for
new trial and sentenced defendant to death. The appeal is
automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).)
Defendant contends that the verdict is not supported by
the evidence. He also assigns as prejudicial error the court's
excusing four prospective jurors on the ground that they
entertained conscientious opinions that -would preclude their
voting for the death penalty, the admission into evidence of
certain photographs, the refusal of the trial court to give
requested instructions, and certain allegedly improper statements of the court and the district attorney.
Defendant is 23 years old and at the time of the crime
was home on leave from service in the Army. The deceased,
Mrs. Minnie McDonald, lived with her daughter, Mrs. Nora
Inglet, in Modesto, California. Mrs. Inglet is 54 years old.
Mrs. McDonald was 84 years old and was in good health
for her age. Mrs. Inglet met defendant in a tavern in December, 1955 or January, 1956. The two were introduced by
defendant's sister. Thereafter Mrs. Inglet saw defendant
on various occasions, usually in the company of friends, but
several times defendant and Mrs. Inglet were alone in defendant's car. Defendant testified that he had been intimate
with Mrs. Inglet, but she denied that and testified that the
last time she was alone with him, defendant attempted to
force her to commit an unnatural sex act and that she left
him and took a taxi home.
On the afternoon of March 19, ] 956, defendant and his
brother, Lester Cheary, left their mother's home in Modesto
and made a tour of several taverns. They traveled in defendant's car, and defendant did the driving. They drank
beer at each of the taverns they visited, and defendant
testified that he also drank whiskey. They had nothing to
eat. Sometime during the afternoon or evening defendant
made a remark about going to see a girl. At about 1 a.m.
on the morning of March 20, defendant and his brother
left Jim's Place, a tavern on highway 99, and drove to the
home of Mrs. Iris McCurdy. Mrs. McCurdy was acquainted
with defendant and was a friend and neighbor of Mrs. Inglet.
Defendant stopped his car at a point across the street from
Mrs. McCurdy's residence. Lester Cheary remained in the
car. Defendant got out of the car and went to Mrs. McCurdy's residence. He knocked on the door, and when Mrs.
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McCurdy answered, he identified himself. He first asked
for the address of J. Reynolds, a friend of Mrs. McCurdy.
Mrs. McCurdy gave him Mr. Reynolds' address. Defendant
then asked for Nora Inglet's address. Mrs. McCurdy refused to give him Mrs. Inglet's address. Defendant then went
next door to the residence of Horace Smith. Mr. Smith told
him that Mrs. Inglet lived farther down the street. Meanwhile, Mrs. McCurdy telephoned Mrs. Inglet and told her
that defendant was looking for her and that he acted as if
he had been drinking. .After leaving the Smith residence,
defendant proceeded to the next house on the block and
started knocking on the door. This was the house in which
Mrs. Inglet and Mrs. McDonald lived. Mrs. Inglet did not
go to the door immediately, but when the knocking continued, she went to the door and asked defendant what he
wanted. Defendant said that he wanted to talk to her and
demanded entry. Mrs. Inglet refused to open the door and
told defendant that if he did not go away she would call
the police. Mrs. Inglet attempted to telephone the police,
but before she could complete the call, defendant forced open
the locked door and grabbed her by the arm. She dropped
the telephone receiver, broke loose from defendant's grasp,
and ran screaming out the rear door of her house to the
home of Mrs. McCurdy. She could not telephone the police
from there because the McCurdy phone was on her party
line and she had not replaced her own telephone receiver.
Mrs. McCurdy's son, Bob, ran to the Smith residence and
telephoned the sheriff's office. Two officers in a patrol car
arrived shortly thereafter, and one of the officers, Mrs. Inglet,
and Mrs. McCurdy entered Mrs. Inglet 's home.
They found Mrs. McDonald lying on her bed. Her face
was bloody. Her bed covers were down to her waist, and
her gown was open to below her breast. The spring of her
bed had fallen to the floor. Defendant stood nearby. He
was bent over toward Mrs. McDonald. His trousers were
unbuttoned, and he held them with hands covered with blood.
The front and upper back of his trousers and his shorts
were stained with blood, which was later found to be of the
same blood group as Mrs. McDonald's. Defendant's shoes
were under one dresser, his jacket on another.
Defendant was taken into the living room, handcuffed,
and seated on a chair. Another officer entered with Lester
Cheary whom he had found across the street from Mrs.
Inglet 's home. ·when he saw his brother, defendant asked,
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"\Vhat are you doing here?" Defendant then said to the
officers, ''He didn't have anything to do with it, I did it.''
Bob McCurdy then entered the room. He said something
to defendant, and defendant asked Bob who he was. Defendant had met Bob McCurdy on several occasions previously.
Defendant and his brother were then taken by the officers
to the sheriff's office. Eu route defendant remarked that
''According to military law, as long as the girl was over
16 years of age, there is nothing that could be done to him."
Defendant testified that after he had been taken to the
sheriff's office, he was told to wash his face with cold water
and that one of the officers walked him up and down in front
of the sheriff's office to keep him awake.
Mrs. McDonald was taken to a hospital. An examination
revealed that her face was badly bruised, her nose and cheek
bone were broken, and that her tongue was nearly severed
from her mouth. After emergency treatment, she was placed
in an oxygen tent.
At about 6 :15 p. m on March 21, Mrs. McDonald died.
After embalmment her body was examined by a pathologist.
He found many bruises about her face, head, and neck, a
large bruise on her chest, three fractured ribs, a bruise on
her groin, and three small semicircular depressions on her
thigh. He found no evidence of rape. He concluded that
her death was caused by hypostatic pneumonia resulting from
her injuries.
Defendant testified that he was intoxicated and that he
did not remember anything that happened between the time
he left the tavern and the time he was handcuffed in Mrs.
Inglet's living room. He further testified that he did not
remember anything about the drive from Mrs. Inglet's residence to the sheriff's office. Lester Cheary testified that he
had paid for the drinks for defendant and himself; that
he had spent about 30 dollars for drinks during the course
of the evening; and that defendant had been drinking more
heavily than he had. Bob McCurdy testified that defendant
repeated himself and acted as if he were drunk or drugged.
Mrs. McCurdy testified that defendant acted as if he had
been drinking. The arresting officer testified that he thought
defendant had been drinking but that defendant had no
difficulty speaking and did not stagger or sway when he
walked. Mr. Smith testified that defendant did not act
drunk when he asked for Mrs. Inglet's address.
In his argument to the jury the district attorney explained

310

[48 C.2d

that he did not eontend that Mrs. McDonald's death was a
deliberate and premeditated homicide. He urged that defendant was guilty of first degree murder on the grounds
that 1\Irs. McDonald's death resulted from injuries inflicted
npon her by defendant in an attempt to rape her or in the
perpetration of a burglary, breaking awl entering Mrs. Inglet's home with intent to rape Mrs. Inglet.
[1] Defendant correctly points out that to prove him
guilty of first degree murder on either of these grounds it
vvas incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that he had
the specific intent to rape when he entered Mrs. Inglet's
home or that he had the specific intent to rape when he assaulted Mrs. McDonald.
[2] Defendant contends that the evidence establishes that
he did not have the intent to rape Mrs. Jnglet when he went
to her home. He points to his testimony that he had been
intimate with Mrs. Inglet and asserts that that testimony
shows that he had reason to expect that Mrs. Inglet would
admit him to her home and that he had no felonious intent
when he knocked at her door. Mrs. Inglet, however, denied
having had intimate relations with defendant. Moreover,
whatever was defendant's original intent, the jury could reasonably infer from his forcing open the door and grabbing
Mrs. Inglet after having been informed by her that he was
not welcome that defendant then had the specific intent to
rape.
Defendant contends that the evidence establishes that he
was so intoxicated that he did not have the specific intent
to rape either Mrs. Inglet. or Mrs. McDonald. [3] It is true
that if defendant •vas so intoxicated that he did not have
the specific intent to rape, he is not guilty of murder in the
first degree. (People v. Burkhart, 211 Cal. 726, 731 [297
P. 11]; see State v. Vanasse, 42 R.I. 278 [107 A. 85] .)
~Whether rlefendant was so intoxicated, however, was a question for the jury. (Pe,ople v. Burkhart, supra.) [4] The
testimony regarding the extent of defendant's intoxication
is conflicting. It appears, however, that he decided to go
to see Mrs. Inglet; that he drove his car from the tavern
to the residence of Mrs. McCurdy; that he identified himself
to Mrs. McCurdy, asked for the address of J. Reynolds,
whom he knew to be a friend of Mrs. McCurdy, and asked
for Mrs. lnglet 's address; that he walked to Mr. Smith's
rPsidence and asked where Mrs. Jnglet lived; that he recognized his brother when he saw him in Mrs. Inglet's living
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room; and that he had the presence of mincl to attempt to
absolve his brother of blame. Counsel for both sides argued
the matter of intoxication at length, and the jury was properly
instructed on the effect of intoxication. The jury's verdict
necessarily implies that they found that defendant was not
so intoxicated that he did not have the spPcific intent to rape.
'l'hat determination is amply supported by the evidence.
[5a] Defendant contends that the trial court committed
prejudic.ial error in asking the prospective jurors whether
they entertained conscientious opinions that would predude
their "voting for a verdict carrying the death penalty," in
allowing extensive argument on this point in the presence
of the jurors, and in excusing four jurors who answered
that they did entertain such opinions. Defendant urges that
the death penalty was thus overemphasized and that the
trial court lent its authority to the propriety of the death
penalty in this case. ['6] The choice by the jury between the
possible punishments for first degree murder is to be made
during and not before the jury's deliberation on that question. We recently held, therefore, that a juror >vho entertains views formulated before trial that compel him to vote
for one of the two possible punishments regardless of what
the evidence at the trial may reYral should be excused.
(People v. Riser, 47 Cal.2d 566, 575-576 [305 P.2d 1].)
[5b] There was no error, therefore, in the court's excusing
the prospective jurors in this case. Although there was some
discussion of the propriety of the court's ruling, the tenor
of the discussion affords no reason to believe that the death
penalty was overemphasized or that the jurors thought that
the court was endorsing the death penalty in this ease. Moreover, the discussion was precipitated and prolonged by defendant's counsel, and he did not suggest that the discussion
be conducted out of the jury's presence until it was nearly
terminated.
[7] Defendant contends that the trial ronrt erred in admitting into evic1ence three photographs of the deeedent's
body taken after embalmment, on the ground that they
were designed to appeal to the emotions of the jury. The
only objection made by defrndant to the admission of thesi'
photographs at the trial was that no proper foundation for
their admission had been lain on the ground that the person who took the photographs had not been identified. That
objection was properly overruled. The photographs were
properly authenticated by the pathologist who looked at them
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and testified that they accurately portrayed what he had
seen. It is not necessary to authenticate a photograph that
the person who took it testify or be identified. (Berkovitz v. American River Gr-avel Co., 191 Cal. 195, 201, 202
[215 P. 675] ; cf. People v. Ah Lee, 164 Cal. 350, 352 [128
P. 1035].) Even if defendant had properly raised his present
objection, the pictures were admissible. [8] Although it is
error to receive in evidence gruesome photographs of a homicide victim designed primarily to arouse the passions of
the jury (People v. Burns, 109 Cal.App.2d 524, 541-542
[241 P.2d 308, 242 P.2d 9] ; People v. Reclston, 139 Cal.
App.2d 485, 490-491 [293 P.2d 880]), such photographs
are admissible when they are relevant to the issues before
the court and their probative value is not outweighed by
the danger of prejudice to the defendant. (People v. Reese,
47 Cal.2d 112, 120-121 [301 P.2d 582].) [9] Whether the
probative value of a particular photograph outweighs its
possible prejudicial effect is a question to be resolved by the
trial court in the exercise of its judicial discretion. (People
v. Reese, sttpra, 47 Cal.2d at 120; People v. Bttrns, supra,
109 Cal.App.2d at 542.) [10] 'l'he photographs in question
were admitted in connection with the pathologist's testimony
regarding the extent of the decedent's injuries and the cause
of her death, the latter being a matter disputed by defendant. The photographs are corroborative of the pathologist's
testimony and help to show the extent of the decedent's
injuries. Admittedly they constitute cumulative evidence, for
they show the same injuries to which the pathologist testified.
That fact, however, was only one among the several to be
considered by the trial court. (See 4 Stan.L.Rev. 589, 590.)
The photographs are not pleasant to look at, but they are
not ghastly. They show the body of the decedent resting
on a table in the mortuary where the pathologist made his
examination. The body is covered by a sheet except for
the head, neck, and center of the chest. No incisions or
marks made by the pathologist in his examination are visible.
We conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in the
admission of these pictures.
Defendant contends that the court erred in refusing to
give the following instructions requested by him:
"Normally, hitting a person with the hands or fist does
not constitute murder in any degree. Therefore, in order
to constitute murder, in any degree, there has to be either
an intent to kill or such wanton and brutal use of the hands
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without provocation as to indicate that they would cause
death or serious bodily injury so as to indicate au abandoned
and malignant heart.'' (Defendant's Instruction Number 31.)
"Where death was caused by acts of violence the character
of the weapon used is of particular significance in determining whether the crime was committed with malice aforethought. If the means employed are of such a nature that
normally they would not be dangerous to life, as where death
is caused by blows of the fist, and there are no aggravating
circumstances, the law will not raise the implication of malice
aforethought.
"If the implement used is not likely to kill or maim, killing is manslaughter unless actual intent to kill is proved."
(Defendant's Instruction Number 32.)
"Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice. One kind of manslaughter, the definition
of which is pertinent to this case, is voluntary manslaughter,
being that which is committed upon a sudden quarrel or
heat of passion." (Defendant's Instruction Number 33.)
The court did not err in refusing to give these instructions.
[11] Voluntary manslaughter, the subject of defendant's
instruction 33, was fully covered by the court in its instructions (CALJIC 305, 311, 311A.) Defendant's instructions
31 and 32 are directed at the difference between murder
and manslaughter, particularly the element of malice aforethought. Those matters were also adequately covered in the
court's instructions to the jury ( CA!J.JI C 301, 305, 308).
[12] Moreover, even if the court erred in refusing to give
defendant's instructions 32 and 33, such error was not prejudicial. The jury found defendant guilty of first degree
murder. As noted previously, the only ground urged by
the district attorney for such a conviction was that Mrs.
McDonald's death resulted from injuries inflicted upon her
by defendant in an attempt to rape her or in the perpetration of a burglary, breaking and entering Mrs. Inglet's home
with the intent to rape Mrs. Inglet. [13] If in the perpetration of a burglary or attempted rape defendant inflicted
injuries upon Mrs. McDonald that caused her death, he is
guilty of first degree murder even if he unintentionally inflicted those injuries upon her. (People v. Sutton, 17 Cal.
App.2d 561, 567 [62 P.2d 397].) It is immaterial whether
he used his hands or fists or something more inherently
dangerous.
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[14] Defendant contends that the trial court committed
prejudicial error in admonishing defendant's counsel in the
presence of the jury. Counsel was cross-examining the pathologist. He asked whether it was not common for elderly
people to be bedridden, apparently in an attempt to show
that the decedent might have been suffering from hypostatic
pneumonia before being injured by defendant. The district
attorney objected to the question on the ground that it was
irrelevant and immaterial. The court overruled the objection, commenting, however, that the question was ''pretty
broad." Counsel for defendant attempted several times to
explain the reason for his question, but the court refused
to permit the explanation, stating, ''I've ruled in your favor,
Mr. Hancock, but I will state that I think you are getting
into a pretty broad field." Counsel said, "I don't think
I am." The court then said, "Well, I'm giving you a little
admonition here. I want to give you every chance to crossquestion this witness, but there's some limit we can't go
beyond.'' Counsel for defendant immediately replied that
he did not appreciate admonishment from the court when
he did not deserve it. The court then stated, ''In the last
analysis, I'm going-! 'm the one that's going to run this
court.'' Defendant contends that since the court criticized
defense counsel, the jury, which looks to the court for guidance, must have looked with skepticism upon the further
efforts of the defense counsel. The court's remarks, however,
were not inappropriate (see People v. Knocke, 94 Cal.App.
55, 60 [270 P. 468] ), and we do not believe that they brought
defense counsel into disfavor with the jury or worked to
the prejudice of defendant. Indeed, before instructing the
jury, the trial court explained to the jurors that in a case
like this the attorneys are necessarily under great pressure
and complimented both attorneys on the manner in which
they tried the case.
[15] Defendant contends that both the trial court and the
district attorney were guilty of prejudicial misconduct in
implying that defendant had an unsatisfactory military
record. Defendant's counsel asked defendant, "How long
have you been in the Army?" The district attorney objected
that it was immaterial. The court commented that "strictly
speaking it probably is.'' The district attorney then added,
''His military record has nothing to do unless he wants
to give his entire military record.'' Defense counsel replied
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that he thought "the jury might be interested in learning
some of his background.'' 'l'he district attorney then made
the following statement, which defendant cites as prejudicial misconduct, "Yes, if you bring out h·is entire rniltiary
backgrmmd, yes." (Italics added.) Defendant's counsel immediately pursued the subject by asking the district attorney, ''Do you know anything about his military background?" The court interrupted with the comment, "Just
a moment.'' Defense counsel then stated, ''I'll assign his last
statement, the district attorney's as prejudicial misconduct
and instruct-and ask that the Court instruct the jury--"
The court then instructed the jury to disregard the last
statement by the district attorney, and added the comment
to defendant's counsel that "I think it's true, that if this
man's military record is going to be put before the record,
the district attorney would have an opportunity to crossquestion him-to cross-examine him on it.'' Defense counsel
did not claim that this was an incorrect statement of the
law but stated that he would withdraw the question if the
court wished. The court then made the following statement,
which defendant now cites as prejudicial error, "Well, so
there is no question about any of the rights of the defendant
being infringed, I'll allow that question and the answer to
that, but any further than that, why-as I say, of course,
the matter will be subject to cross-examination and can't
help be brought out." (Italics added.) Defendant's counsel
did not object or take exception to this statement, and defendant answered the question, saying, "Yes, I've been in
the Army six years.'' There was no attempt to elicit any
information concerning defendant's military record during
cross-examination or to introduce such evidence at any other
time.
The district attorney's insinuation that defendant's military record was unsatisfactory was improper (see People
v. Anthony, 185 Cal. 152, 158 [196 P. 47] ), and the trial
court correctly admonished the jury to disregard the district
attorney's statement. In view of the court's admonition,
we do not believe that defendant was prejudiced by the
statement of the district attorney. Unfortunately, the later
comment by the trial court contained an implication similar
to that in the district attorney's statement and was therefore
likewise improper. Coming such a short time after its admonition to disregard the district attorney's statement, how-
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ever, the court's statement was almost certainly inadvertent,
and as noted previously, the court's attention was not called
to the implication in its statement. [16] .A claim of misconduct on the part of the trial court will ordinarily not be
considered on appeal unless the party who complains has
given the trial court an opportunity to correct the error or
false impression. (People v. Arnaya, 40 Cal.2d 70, 78 [251
P.2d 324] and cases there cited.) [17] Nevertheless, in view
of the serious nature of the offense of which defendant has
been convicted we have considered the trial court's statement.
Upon reviewing the whole record, however, we are convinced
that the court's statement was not prejudicial to defendant.
[18] Defendant contends that the district attorney committed several acts of prejudicial misconduct during his
argument to the jury. When he was summarizing the testimony of the pathologist regarding evidence of rape, the
district attorney stated that the pathologist "was unable to
determine whether there had been any intercourse with
Minnie McDonald.'' Counsel for defendant objected and
termed this statement a "deliberate misquotation." The
court stated that any misquotation did not appear deliberate,
although it was possible that the district attorney's summary
of the testimony was not accurate. Then, after the district
attorney urged that his remarks be struck from the record,
the court ordered the remarks stricken and admonished the
jury to pay no attention to them. The district attorney
then said, "Well, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, your
recollections are sufficient to recall what the doctor testified
to, Dr. Purvis, in that regard.'' Defense counsel did not
object and did not request an admonition concerning this
last remark. .Although this last statement of the district
attorney might be interpreted as an attempt to have the jury
disregard the court's admonition and accept his own misstatement as true, it is doubtful that the jury so interpreted
it in view of the district attorney's previous request that his
remark be struck from the record. In any event, neither
this remark nor the original statement of the district attorney was prejudicial. The court informed the jury that the
district attorney's summary of the pathologist's testimony
might not be accurate, and later the defense counsel, during
his own argument, quoted the actual statement of the pathologist, ''I found no injuries about the pelvic area. The opening
of the vagina was rather narrow and I saw no evidence of
any marks.''
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[19] Defendant points out that the district attorney again
misstated the evidence when he asserted that Mrs. McCurdy
had testified that defendant was pulling up his trousers when
she entered the bedroom. Mrs. McCurdy actually testified
that "he was holding his pants." Mrs. McCurdy's testimony
was fresh in the minds of the jurors, since the trial lasted
only a few days. It is unlikely, therefore, that the district
attorney's statement misled the jury. Moreover, defendant
did not object to this statement at the trial.
[20] Although he concedes that the district attorney could
present to the jury his theory of the case based upon inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence (People v. Burwell, 44 Cal.2d 16, 39-40 [279 P.2d 744] ), defendant contends that, during his argument to the jury, the district
attorney drew two inferences that find no support in the
evidence. The first inference was that defendant was pulling up his trousers when Mrs. Inglet, Mrs. McCurdy, and
the arresting officer entered the bedroom. This inference
was a reasonable one. It was uncontroverted that defendant's
trousers were unbuttoned; Mrs. McCurdy testified that he was
holding his pants; and there were blood smears on the back
and top of defendant's shorts and trousers, which could
have been caused by defendant's pulling up his pants with
his hands, which were covered with blood. [21] The second
inference was that defendant ''reached over underneath the
blankets and underneath her [Mrs. McDonald's] nightgown
and grabbed her by the leg and at the same time crawling
on the bed. . . . '' This inference was also a reasonable one.
There were marks on Mrs. McDonald's thigh that could have
been made by defendant's fingernails, and her bed spring
could have been knocked down by defendant in climbing onto
the bed.
[22] Two statements made by the district attorney during
his argument to the jury are cited as gross misconduct on
the ground that they were inflammatory in nature. Although
defendant did not object to either statement at the trial,
we have examined them and find no error. One was the
district attorney's reference to ''the pure, killing horror of
the situation." He waR speaking of the Ritnation when Mrs.
Inglet found that tbe McCurdy telephone wonld not function and she could not summon the polier to aid her mother
because she had not replaced her own telephone receiver.
The district attorney's description of this situation was not
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unreasonable. The other allegedly inflammatory statement
was that defendant "didn't care who [his victim] was as long
as he satisfied that monstrous lust of his." Such an inference
could reasonably be drawn from the evidence.
[23] Defendant contends that the district attorney's summary of the requirements of rape was prejudicially erroneous.
The district attorney stated that "the specific intent which
is involved is the intent to have sexual intercourse.'' When
defendant objected, the court stated that it would instruct
the jury as to the elements of the offense at the proper time.
The court added that the district attorney's statement was
''not out of line,'' but when defense counsel pointed out
that the district attorney implied that one cannot intend
sexual intercourse without intending rape, the court ruled
that the remark of the district attorney was improper. Later,
the court charged the jury that counsels' statements as to
the law were not to be relied upon by the jury, and the court
gave correct instructions on the law of rape. In this light,
the misstatement of the district attorney was not prejudicial
misconduct.
[24] Defendant also cites as prejudicial misconduct the
district attorney's statement as to the law of burglary and
felony murder. The district attorney argued: ''If the defendant broke in that front door with the intent to rape
Nora Inglet, he is guilty of Murder in the First Degree. If
at the time he smashed in the front door, when he crossed
that line, he had committed a burglary; and the killing was
done in the perpetration of burglary, in carrying out the
act, and he's guilty of Murder in the First Degree if you
want to accept that.'' We find in this argument no misstatement of the law. Moreover, the court admonished the
jury not to rely on the statements of counsel as to the law
and gave appropriate instructions concerning burglary and
murder.
[25] The final citation of misconduct concerns a statement of the district attorney during his argument to the
jury that counsel for defendant had not requested an acquittal because he did not wish to insult the intelligence
of the jury. Counsel for defendant immediately entered a
vigorous objection. After first noting that some remarks of
defense counsel could be interpreted as the district attorney
argued, the court admonished the jury to disregard the district attorney's statement. In view of the vigorous objection
by defense counsel and the admonition by the court, it is

.Apr.l957]

PEOPLE

1).

CHEARY

319

[48 C.2d 3()1; 309 P.2d 431]

improbable that the jury was misled by the district attorney's
statement into believing that defendant himself lacked faith
in his defense to the charge of :first degree murder.
The judgment and order denying a new trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and
McComb, J., concurred.
C.ARTER, J.-I dissent.
I cannot agree that the evidence is sufficient on which to
predicate a verdict of murder of the :fil'st degree under the
law of this state. We are not here interpreting or applying
the law of Moses-"whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall
his blood be shed." (Gen. IX.6.) ".And thine eye shall
not pity; but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth,
hand for hand, foot for foot.'' (Den. XIX.21.)
We are interpreting and applying the law of California.
Under our law every homicide is not murder and every
murder is not of the :first degree. First degree murder is
defined in section 189 of the Penal Code as follows : ".All
murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying
in wait, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate,
and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, robbery,
burglary, or mayhem, is murder of the :first degree; and all
other kinds of murders are of the second degree.''
.As correctly stated in the majority opinion the only theory
upon which the homicide here could be held to be murder
of the :first degree is, that it was committed in an attempt
to perpetrate burglary or rape. From an examination of
the record there appears to be little doubt but that defendant
was intoxicated beyond a point where he did not know or
appreciate what he was doing.· But conceding that the evidence was sufficient to support the implied :finding of the
jury that he was not intoxicated, I am convinced that the
evidence was not sufficient to give rise to an inference that
he intended to perpetrate rape on either Mrs. Inglet or Mrs.
McDonald. In my opinion the only rational conclusion to
be reached from the record in this case is that defendant
while in a drunken stupor perpetrated the sordid acts which
resulted in the death of Mrs. McDonald. It was a ghastly
and terrible crime, unprovoked and unjustified from any
point of view, but I am unable to reach the conclusion from
the record before us that it falls within the definition of
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murder of the first degree as defined in the above quoted
section of the Penal Code. (People v. Kelley, 208 Cal. 387
l281 P. G09]; People v. Tubby, 34 Cal.2d 72 [207 P.2d 51].)
For the foregoing reasons I would reduce the degree of
the crime to that of murder of the second degree.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied May 8,
1957. Cart()r, ,J., was of the opinion that the petition shoul<l
be granted.
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[1] Licenses-Power to License or Tax-Territorial Limitations.-

·where a business license tax sought to be collected is a
privilege tax exacted for the privilege of engaging in the
activity of "selling," and this activity takes place within the
city, the rate of tax may be measured by the gross receipts
attributable to selling activities within the city though some
of them are attributable to extraterritorial elements, such as
production and delivery of goods, since such selling activity
can constitutionally be taxed by the city though the goods
never enter its territorial limits.
[2] !d.-Power to License or Tax-Territorial Limitations.-To
allow a city to levy a license tax based on gross receipts attributable to selling activities outside the city would be an
unreasonable discrimination and a denial of equal protection
of the law.
[3] Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Statutes-Construction.-\Vhere a statute or ordinance is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the
other unconstitutional in whole or in part, the court will adopt
the construction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used, will render it valid in its
entirety or free from doubt as to its constitutionality, though
the other construction is equally reasonable.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Licenses, § 7 et seq.; Am.Jur., Licenses, § 7
et seq.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 61 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Constitutional Law, § 96 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Licenses, § 9; [3] Constitutional
Law,§ 48; [4] Licenses,§ 35.5.

